The famous eastern tour of inspection undertaken by Scipio Aemilianus, L. Metellus Calvus and Sp. Mummius is now generally dated 140/39 b.c., where Diodorus seems to put it. The accepted view, however, involves discounting an explicit statement by Cicero. It also presents historical difficulties. In 140 b.c. there was no need for such a high-powered Roman initiative, and scholars can discover only very minor political results. Sherwin-White indeed criticised the envoys severely, especially Scipio; they were culpably blind to the new (...) menace of Parthia, which was steadily dismembering the Seleucid Empire east of the Euphrates. This is fair criticism only on the 140/39 b.c. dating. Did Scipio and his colleagues fail to see what is patent to us today? It is time to reexamine rigorously the underlying assumption. In Acad. prior. 2.5 Cicero defends a Roman noble's love of Greek learning in the following terms: ego autem cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nee philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. The date of the embassy must be 144/3 b.c., if we follow the logic of this passage. Scipio was censor with L. Mummius in 142/1 b.c. and their public quarrel was hardly less notable than the embassy, in which L. Mummius' brother shared. Another Ciceronian passage – written some six years earlier – seems to contradict the dating offered in 45 b.c. In de republica 6.11 the elder Africanus prophesies his grandson's future greatness in the famous dream. (shrink)

The famous eastern tour of inspection undertaken by Scipio Aemilianus, L. Metellus Calvus and Sp. Mummius is now generally dated 140/39 b.c., where Diodorus seems to put it. The accepted view, however, involves discounting an explicit statement by Cicero. It also presents historical difficulties. In 140 b.c. there was no need for such a high-powered Roman initiative, and scholars can discover only very minor political results. Sherwin-White indeed criticised the envoys severely, especially Scipio; they were culpably blind to the new (...) menace of Parthia, which was steadily dismembering the Seleucid Empire east of the Euphrates. This is fair criticism only on the 140/39 b.c. dating. Did Scipio and his colleagues fail to see what is patent to us today? It is time to reexamine rigorously the underlying assumption. In Acad. prior. 2.5 Cicero defends a Roman noble's love of Greek learning in the following terms: ego autem cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nee philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. The date of the embassy must be 144/3 b.c., if we follow the logic of this passage. Scipio was censor with L. Mummius in 142/1 b.c. and their public quarrel was hardly less notable than the embassy, in which L. Mummius' brother shared. Another Ciceronian passage – written some six years earlier – seems to contradict the dating offered in 45 b.c. In de republica 6.11 the elder Africanus prophesies his grandson's future greatness in the famous dream. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:278 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY What a revolution the past century has made in both the general idea of morality andin the practical attitudes of "moral sense"l The political and moral earthquakes that have cracked the solid ground of Wayland's "moral law" and "didactic" complacency have blown us all into a space whose air may be purer but whose endless visibility into the dark void is less assuring. HERBERT W. (...) SCHNEIDER Claremont, California Le Pluralisme Dramatique de Georges Sorel. By Georges Goriely. (Paris: Marcel Rivi~re et Cie, 1962. 244 pp. Price not given.) Professor Georges Goriely of the Free University of Brussels has made one more valiant attempt to rescue Sorel the thinker from the reputation fastened upon him by the title of his Rdflexions sur la Violence in 1906. For most readers he has been the author of that one book, which is seldom read in the light of his other works. It is significant that Goriely reaches it only upon his page 199, barely twenty pages before his study terminates. Also worthy of note is the fact that of the over one hundred critical books and articles about Sorel which are listed in his bibliography, only two are in English: Richard Humphrey's Georges Sorel: Prophet Without Honor (1954) and James M. Meisel's The Genesis of Georges Sorel (1951). In European discussions Sorel frequently shares the company of such names as Croce, Bergson, and Nietzsche. But in the Anglo-Saxon world he has had in general a bad press, or none at all. A far-from-systematic philosopher, his writings, most of them originally articles composed in the heat of European controversies, have seemed remote from transatIantic concerns. He has been reputed "the father of syndicalism" in a country where the adjective most often applied to syndicalism is "criminal." When Mussolini proclaimed at one time that the R~flexions was his favorite bedside book, Sorel seemed to add the paternity of Fascism to his list. All that was needed to complete his damnation by labels was the dread word "anti-intellectual," and that has been freely applied to him. Nevertheless, Professor Goriely finds it possible to take Sorel's ideas seriously, quite apart from the political misuses which have been made of them. He sees that Sorel was primarily a pragmatic moralist immersed in his times and intent upon finding some way to bring about a European ricorso, a rejuvenation of classic republican ethics. At the turn of the century he saw only mediocrity and decadence: democracy had become demagogy, and industrial capitalism a mess of corruption. Sorel's great search was for a moral lever, for something dynamic, some source of energy in men which could be tapped in order to restore virtue and dignity and morale in the common man. Being imbued with historical relativism, and played upon by vigorous and contradictory influences (Vico, Marx, Bergson, Nietzsche, P~guy), Sorel steadily revised his views. It is that fact which gives his contradiction-filled philosophy the character of a "dramatic pluralism." Of one thing, however, Sorel was always convinced: intellect alone could not re-invigorate European ethics. The feelings must be stirred by something which, as early as 1894, he called a "myth." He had no use for rationally planned utopias operated by savants in the manner of Saint-Simon or Comte (whom he constantly attacked). He groped for a moving, even an "infinite" goal to be generated from history by the creative activity of men, such as the famous "general strike." A Norman like Alexis de Tocqueville, his roots were in a mixed liberal-republican aristocracy on the classic model, calling for large numbers of "social heroes" adapted to the industrial age. This r corps has nothing in common with the BOOK REVIEWS 279 shirted gangsters of the totalitarian regimes. Only gradually did Sorel come to seek his paragons of virtue among the proletariat, partly because of his disillusionment with Jean Jaur~s over the Dreyfus case. Sorel had been one of the first to champion Dreyfus, but felt that demagogues had transformed the latter's cause into a new dogmatism and a new establishment. Sorel was genuinely concerned about some of the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 117 Undoubtedly Heidegger's detractors will find in this essay the hallmarks of what they abhor: forced interpretations, dubious etymologies, and overblown claims. Heidegger's followers, on the other hand, will maintain that this essay further enhances his already sure reputation as the most profound and original metaphysician of our time. Those less committed one way or the other will at least find Heidegger's latest dialogue with his philosophical (...) forebears provocative and stimulating. PETER Fuss University o/California,Riverside Jeremy Bentham: An Odyssey of Ideas. By Mary P. Mack. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. xiii + 482. $7.50.) Since this is only the first of two projected volumes about Bentham, only an interim report will be possible. The study extends from its subject's birth in 1748 to the death of his father in 1792, when the 44-year-old thinker, on the way to becoming a radical democrat at the height of the French Revolution, found himself endowed with half of the fortune which had supported his father's crusty Toryism. Consequently, it is a story of rebellion and partial escape from the ancestral world of law in the direction of the promises of the new science, culminating in a career devoted to an almost incredible variety of reforms. That Bentham deserves this "first full-scale study of his thought and times in over sixty years" can hardly be doubted in view of the many part-views and caricatures which he brought upon himself by his many elderly eccentricities. This biographer sees him frankly as "one of the most subtle and powerful analytic minds in the history of Western civilization... a great man who has often been misunderstood and therefore undervalued" (pp. xi, 5). She proposes to remedy the situation by the adoption of a fresh perspective that will enable the reader to "see him whole." That admirable resolution faces formidable obstacles, as every student of Bentham knows. It is about like attempting to map a vast, swampy wilderness from an airplane. For Bentham's "odyssey of ideas" was a true wandering among a profusion of them, beginning and abandoning one project after another in a troubled period of change. The dilemma faced by the author is a cruel one: to give an authentic account of Bentham historically she must reproduce the chaotic carelessness of much of his philosophizing ; while to seek to rear a consistent philosophical system from the sketches to be found in the great masses of his wordage, often mingled and mangled by the glosses of disciples, is to lose touch with the man. In Bentham we are dealing with a writer who was always communicating and frequently talking about communication without ever having mastered the art of cumulative philosophical argument. He was more intent upon being fertile than upon being consistent. His mind kept on growing for decades, which meant that he was constantly outgrowing his earlier interests and insights. His eager and all-devouring curiosity became a veritable seed-bed of suggestions from which sprouted an unmatched array of proposals of specific reforms. Yet the story of his many projects resembles that of another seminal contemporary, Henri de Saint-Simon. The perpetual mobility of intellect which marked them both is summed up in Mary Mack's reiterated comment: "Once again Bentham ran from a good thing to a better, and left only fragments behind him" (p. 417). The philosophical underpinning of his doctrines was never quite complete. As Benjamin Franklin once said of himself in the 118 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY role of scientist, Bentham was a good "starter of game" for the guns of others to bring down. As portrayed with accuracy in this study, Bentham became in time an intensely pragmatic thinker, passionately desirous not only of showing the directions which reforms ought to take but also of bringing them to pass. He searched incessantly for the right audience, that is, the one with the power to improve the world according to his enlightened ideas. He began by appealing to the elite, and then turned in disgust to the people. His score as a practical reformer amounted to one long series of rebuffs, transformed after his death into... (shrink)

Unlike some other reproductions of classic texts (1) We have not used OCR(Optical Character Recognition), as this leads to bad quality books with introduced typos. (2) In books where there are images such as portraits, maps, sketches etc We have endeavoured to keep the quality of these images, so they represent accurately the original artefact. Although occasionally there may be certain imperfections with these old texts, we feel they deserve to be made available for future generations to enjoy.

The eukaryotic cytoskeleton appears to have evolved from ancestral precursors related to prokaryotic FtsZ and MreB. FtsZ and MreB show 40–50% sequence identity across different bacterial and archaeal species. Here I suggest that this represents the limit of divergence that is consistent with maintaining their functions for cytokinesis and cell shape. Previous analyses have noted that tubulin and actin are highly conserved across eukaryotic species, but so divergent from their prokaryotic relatives as to be hardly recognizable from sequence comparisons. One (...) suggestion for this extreme divergence of tubulin and actin is that it occurred as they evolved very different functions from FtsZ and MreB. I will present new arguments favoring this suggestion, and speculate on pathways. Moreover, the extreme conservation of tubulin and actin across eukaryotic species is not due to an intrinsic lack of variability, but is attributed to their acquisition of elaborate mechanisms for assembly dynamics and their interactions with multiple motor and binding proteins. A new structure‐based sequence alignment identifies amino acids that are conserved from FtsZ to tubulins. The highly conserved amino acids are not those forming the subunit core or protofilament interface, but those involved in binding and hydrolysis of GTP. BioEssays 29:668–677, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

An important question for bacterial cell division is how the invaginating septum can overcome the turgor force generated by the high osmolarity of the cytoplasm. I suggest that it may not need to. Several studies in Gram‐negative bacteria have shown that the periplasm is isoosmolar with the cytoplasm. Indirect evidence suggests that this is also true for Gram‐positive bacteria. In this case the invagination of the septum takes place within the uniformly high osmotic pressure environment, and does not have to (...) fight turgor pressure. A related question is how the V‐shaped constriction of Gram‐negative bacteria relates to the plate‐like septum of Gram‐positive bacteria. I collected evidence that Gram‐negative bacteria have a latent capability of forming plate‐like septa, and present a model in which septal division is the basic mechanism in both Gram‐positive and Gram‐negative bacteria. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S EARLY VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Agostino Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 He not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, but he also authored treatises (...) on humanist topics? Recent scholars have tended to concentrate their attention on his psychological doctrines, no doubt because he was one of the major opponents of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy.4 Nifo published his De Immortalitate Animae in 1518 as a reply to the De lmmortalitate Ardmae, On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le sue opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvIe si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, II (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvIe si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876). 4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvIe si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, XXIX (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451] 452 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift.6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De Anima (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the... (shrink)

Quelle est la nature et la fonction des sentiments dans l’activité de connaissance et, plus largement, dans l’existence humaine? Cette question, massive, n’a cessé d’inquiéter la philosophie, dont l’histoire paraît à bien des égards se confondre avec celle d’une opposition entre la lucidité de la raison et l’obscurité dangereuse des passions. Si le discours philosophique n’a jamais nié l’importance des sentiments, ni leur rôle dans l’ordonnancement général de la vie humaine, ce discours est cependant empreint d’ambiguïtés, comme l’est, déjà, le (...) statut du « cœur » dans la tripartition fonctionnelle de l’âme présentée par Platon : ni réductible à la droite raison, ni relégué dans la sphère des désirs qui nous empêchent de contempler les Idées, le sentiment est cet intermédiaire allié de la raison qui met en mouvement nos réactions morales. Cette ambiguïté se retrouve à l’âge classique, lorsque le discours philosophique découvre le fonctionnement des passions et cherche les modèles scientifiques susceptibles d’en rendre compte, hésitant entre la physiologie , la géométrie , la médecine et les sciences de la nature .En faisant de l’affectivité l’une des structures fondamentales de l’existence, la phénoménologie a replacé au centre du questionnement philosophique la problématique des sentiments. Mais comment décrire ces expériences singulières – celle de l’amour, de l’angoisse, du désespoir ou de la joie – sans les confondre avec des objets? Comment donner du sens aux affects sans adopter ce point de vue surplombant des sciences de la nature, qui confond le discours des causes et celui des raisons? Comment, en d’autres termes, continuer à parler des sentiments de manière raisonnée, tout en reconnaissant que les sentiments nous font autant que nous les connaissons – tout en continuant, par conséquent, à être réceptifs à leur pouvoir de nous ébranler? (shrink)